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ABSTRACT
It is a well-known claim that Francis Bacon gave an auxiliary role to mathematics in his nat-
ural philosophical inquiries. It has also been argued that Bacon gave this auxiliary role to 
mathematics just after he extended the role of mathematics to all parts of natural philoso-
phy in his De Augmentis Scientiarum (1623), while he confined its role to metaphysics in his 
Advancement of Learning (1605). In this paper, however, I argue that there is no difference 
in Bacon’s attitude towards the role of mathematics in natural philosophical inquiries be-
tween 1605 and 1623.
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RESUMO 
É uma afirmação bem conhecida que Francis Bacon deu um papel auxiliar à matemática 
em suas investigações de filosofia natural. Argumentou-se também que Bacon atribuiu este 
papel auxiliar à matemática logo após ter estendido o papel da matemática a todas as 
partes da filosofia natural em seu De Augmentis Scientiarum (1623), enquanto ele limitou 
seu papel à metafísica em seu Advancement of Learning (1605). Neste artigo, no entanto, 
argumento que não há diferença na atitude de Bacon em relação ao papel da matemática 
em suas investigações de filosofia natural entre 1605 e 1623.
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1. Introduction
Graham Rees argues that Bacon has a different attitude 
towards the role of mathematics in natural philosophy in his 
Advancement of Learning (1605) and De Augmentis Scientiarum 
(1623).2 For Rees, Bacon placed mathematics as an adjunct 
of metaphysics in the Advancement of Learning. As to De Aug-
mentis Scientiarum, Rees argues that Bacon extended the role 
of mathematics in this work to all the parts of natural philos-
ophy: physics, metaphysics, mechanics, and magic. However, 
for Rees, this shift was accompanied by a reducing of the role 
of mathematics to auxiliary.
In this paper, I argue that Bacon placed mathematics as 
a branch of metaphysics both in the Advancement of Learning 
and De Augmentis Scientiarum. Regarding this, I argue that 
the reason why he placed (mixed) mathematics as a branch 
of metaphysics is that the object of mixed mathematics, 
that is, quantity determined, is one of the essential forms 
of things. Therefore, contrary to Rees’ argument, placing 
mathematics as a branch of metaphysics does not come to 
mean that Bacon only confined mathematics’ role to meta-
physics. I will also argue that Bacon gave an auxiliary role 
to mathematics not only in the Advancement of Learning but 
also in De Augmentis Scientiarum. This shows us that his at-
titude towards the role of mathematics did not change be-
tween 1605 and 1623.
2. An auxiliary role for 
mathematics as a branch 
of metaphysics both in the 
Advancement of Learning and 
De Augmentis Scientiarum
Let me start with the following quote from Bacon:
I have thought it better to designate Math-
ematics, seeing that they are of so much im-
portance both in Physics and Metaphysics 
and Mechanics and Magic, as appendices 
and auxiliaries to them all (Bacon, De aug-
mentis, SEH IV, p. 370).
 
Rees argues that giving importance to mathematics both 
in physics, metaphysics, mechanics, and magic does not 
appear anywhere in the Advancement of Learning. He also 
states the following:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that 
between 1605 and 1623 mathematics had 
ceased to be regarded as an adjunct of meta-
physics; Bacon had shifted his position in fa-
vour of acknowledging a much wider role for 
mathematics in the natural sciences (Rees, 
1986, p. 412. See also Rees, 1985, p. 27).
It follows then that we should ask why Rees believed Bacon 
limited the role of mathematics to metaphysics in the Ad-
vancement of Learning. We can find the answer in the following 
words of Bacon:
Neuerthelesse there remaineth yet another 
part of NATVRALL PHILOSOPHIE, which is 
commonly made a principall part, and hold-
eth ranke with PHISICKE speciall and META-
PHISICKE: which is Mathematicke, but I think 
it more agreable to the Nature of things, and 
to the light of order, to place it as a Branch 
of Metaphisicke (Bacon, The Advancement, 
OFB IV, p. 87; underlining added).
Since Bacon says that he places mathematics as a branch 
of metaphysics in the Advancement of Learning, Rees must 
have surmised that Bacon confined mathematics’ role to 
metaphysics. However, when we look at De Augmentis Sci-
entiarum, we can also see that Bacon placed mathematics 
as a branch of metaphysics:
ARISTOTLE has well remarked that Phys-
ic and Mathematic produce Practice or 
Mechanic; wherefore as we have already 
treated of the speculative and operative 
part of natural philosophy, it remains to 
speak of Mathematic, which is a science 
auxiliary to both. Now this in the common 
philosophy is annexed as a third part to 
Physic and Metaphysic; but for my part, 
being now engaged in reviewing and re-
handling these things, if I meant to set it 
down as a substantive and principal sci-
ence, I should think it more agreeable 
both to the nature of the thing and the 
clearness of order to place it as a branch 
of Metaphysic (Bacon, De augmentis, SEH 
IV, p. 369; underlining added).
Since Bacon did not say in the Advancement of Learning that 
mathematics had importance both in physics, metaphysics, 
mechanics and magic, Rees seems to conclude that Bacon 
confined the role of mathematics to metaphysics in the Ad-
vancement of Learning. Also, Rees argues that Bacon gave the 
auxiliary role to mathematics in De Augmentis Scientiarum 
after he extended the role of mathematics to physics, meta-
physics, mechanics and magic. However, when we read the 
following words of Bacon, we can see that he had the idea 
2 Bacon sent a letter accompanying a copy of De Augmentis Scientiarum to the King, in which he writes, “This book was the first thing 
that ever I presented to your majesty […] It is a translation, but almost enlarged to a new work” (Craik, 1846, p. 40).
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of the auxiliary role for mathematics in the Advancement of 
Learning as well:
MIXT (mathematics) hath for subiect some 
Axiomes or parts of Naturall Philosophie: 
and considereth Quantitie determined [the 
object of mixed mathematics], as it is aux-
iliarie and incident vnto them (Bacon, The 
Advancement, OFB IV, p. 88).
A similar statement can be seen in De Augmentis Scientiarum:
Mixed Mathematic has for its subject some 
axioms and parts of natural philosophy, and 
considers quantity [quantity determined] in 
so far as it assists to explain, demonstrate, 
and actuate these (Bacon, De augmentis, 
SEH IV, p. 371).
Placing (mixed) mathematics3 as a branch of metaphysics and 
giving an auxiliary role to it both in the Advancement of Learn-
ing and De Augmentis Scientiarum refutes Rees’ above-men-
tioned arguments. As Rees states, Bacon only mentioned the 
importance of mathematics both in physics, metaphysics, 
mechanics, and magic in De Augmentis Scientiarum, but this 
is not enough to conclude that Bacon did not give the same 
importance to mathematics in the Advancement of Learning. 
Rees argues that Bacon gave an auxiliary role to mathematics 
in De Augmentis Scientiarum as a result of an extension of the 
role of mathematics to every part of natural philosophy, but, 
as I have shown above, Bacon also gave an auxiliary role to 
mathematics in the Advancement of Learning.4
What Bacon did in the Advancement of Learning (and 
also in De Augmentis Scientiarum) was indeed place math-
ematics as a branch of metaphysics, and this was wrongly 
interpreted by Rees as confining the role of mathematics 
to metaphysics. 
Now, what does placing mathematics as a branch of 
metaphysics mean and why did Bacon do it?
The reason Bacon placed (mixed) mathematics as a 
branch of metaphysics was that the object of (mixed) math-
ematics, that is, quantity proportionable (or quantity deter-
mined), is a form. As Bacon states:
And it is true also that of all other formes 
(as wee vnderstand formes) it [quanti-
ty determined, or proportionable] is the 
most abstracted, and separable from mat-
ter and therefore most proper to Meta-
phisicke; which hath likewise beene the 
cause, why it hath beene better laboured, 
and enquired, than any of the other 
formes, which are more immersed into 
Matter (Bacon, The Advancement, OFB 
IV, p. 87; underlinings added).
Also, in De Augmentis Scientiarum, he states:
For Quantity (which is the subject of Math-
ematic), when applied to matter, is as it 
were the dose of Nature, and is the cause 
of a number of effects in things natural; and 
therefore it must be reckoned as one of the 
Essential Forms of things (Bacon, De aug-
mentis, SEH IV, p. 369-370).
As is seen, Bacon thought that the object of (mixed) math-
ematics (that is, quantity determined) is one of the essen-
tial forms of things, the most abstracted one from matter 
among other forms. We can therefore conclude that since 
Baconian metaphysics deals with forms, and since the ob-
ject of mixed mathematics (quantity determined) is one 
of the essential forms of things, then there is nothing to be 
surprised at in the placing of mathematics as a branch of 
3 The term ‘mixed mathematics’ corresponds to Aristotelian mathematical sciences, which can be considered as falling between pure 
mathematics and physics. Gary Brown argues that “the term ‘mixed mathematics’ can be traced back at least as far as Francis Bacon” 
(Brown, 1991, p. 81). They were also called exact sciences or middle sciences (mediae scientiae); see Grant (2004, p. 20).
4 Bacon states why he gave an auxiliary role to mathematics:
Which indeed I am in a manner compelled to do, by reason of the daintiness and pride of mathematicians, who will needs have 
this science almost domineer over Physic. For it has come to pass, I know not how, that Mathematic and Logic, which ought to be 
but the handmaids of Physic, nevertheless presume on the strength of the certainty which they possess to exercise dominion over 
it (Bacon, De augmentis, SEH IV, p. 370).
Bacon gave an auxiliary role to mathematics because he did not believe that mathematical reasoning or logic could discover the truth 
of nature, so he offered the priority of physics in natural inquiries. We can say that an auxiliary role of mathematics refers to a priority of 
physics. A priority of physics is the idea that inquiries into the physical reasons for something should precede mathematical demonstra-
tions of it. Rees also says the following about the priority of physics:
According to Bacon the correct geometrical description would emerge only from a correct physical theory, from “inquiries into 
physical causes” and the truth of things. He insisted on the priority of physics in the business of solving astronomical and cosmolog-
ical problems, and dismissed the purely descriptive enterprise with its infatuation with compounded perfect circles as a lamentable 
instance of misapplied effort (Rees, 1986, p. 414).
Giuliano Mori expresses well the idea of the priority of physics in Baconian natural philosophy: “What is hence at stake is not the math-
ematization of nature, but, on the contrary, the ‘naturalization of mathematics’ […]” (Mori, 2016, p. 20). For the mathematization of 
nature, see Henry (2002, p. 14-30), Biener (2008, p. 9-11), and Goldenbaum (2016). Dana Jalobeanu argues that there is a possibility 
of a mathematical physics which is peculiar to Bacon (see Jalobeanu, 2016, p. 53-55). The mathematical physics which was used in this 
peculiar meaning by Jalobeanu should not be confused with the mathematical physics of Copernicus, Galileo and Kepler.
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metaphysics.5 This shows us that, in contrast to the Aristo-
telian divisions of sciences, mixed mathematics (or math-
ematical sciences) was considered by Bacon as a part of 
natural philosophy. 
As to pure mathematics, it includes the sciences of 
geometry and arithmetic.6 However, mixed mathemat-
ics includes mathematical sciences such as perspective, 
optics, astronomy, and harmony. Pure mathematics deals 
with quantity (indefinite), which is completely severed 
from matter and from the axioms (or causes)7 of natural 
philosophy, while mixed mathematics deals with quantity 
(determined) and is not completely severed from matter.8 
Since the object of mixed mathematics is not completely 
severed from matter, it has some axioms of natural philos-
ophy, which means that the subject of mixed mathematics 
(quantity determined) is ‘causatiue in Nature of a number 
of Effects’. As Bacon states: “[…] Quantitie determined, or 
proportionable […] appeareth to bee one of the essentiall 
forms of things; as that, that is causatiue in Nature of a 
number of Effects” (Bacon, The Advancement, OFB IV, p. 
87-88, underlinings added). In these words, we can see that 
the reason Bacon placed mixed mathematics as a branch of 
metaphysics was that its object is one of the essential forms 
of things, and this makes the object of mixed mathematics 
causative of a number of effects in nature.
Just because Bacon did not place pure mathematics in 
natural philosophy, we cannot conclude that he did not give 
any importance to it. When we consider natural philoso-
phy, to be classified as a part of it, any discipline has to have 
some axioms of nature as its subject. Any progress in pure 
mathematics and logic will be helpful to progress in math-
ematical sciences, thereby in natural philosophy; but, since 
pure mathematics deals with quantity indefinite, which is 
completely severed from matter, it has no axioms of nature, 
and this makes pure mathematics unsuitable to be classified 
in natural philosophy.9 So, the difference between quantity 
indefinite (the object of pure mathematics) and quantity 
determined (the object of mixed mathematics) is that while 
the former is completely severed from matter, which means 
that it has no axioms of nature, the latter is not completely 
severed from matter, and this status of quantity determined 
is the reason it is a causing agent of many effects in nature.
Before proceeding further, let me explain what Bacon 
means by saying that quantity determined ‘is causatiue in 
Nature of a number of Effects’. Bacon gives some examples 
to show us how quantity can be the cause of some effects in 
nature. For example, we can observe that a large quantity of 
water corrupts slowly, while small quantities of water corrupt 
quickly. Again, when we consider casks, which can have a 
larger quantity of wine and beer in them than bottles, these 
liquids ripen more quickly than they do in bottles. Also, we 
can see that a large quantity of magnets can draw more iron 
than a small quantity (see Bacon, Novum, OFB XI, Book Two, 
§. 47, p. 383). Since quantity determined is the cause of many 
effects in nature, mixed mathematics was placed by Bacon as 
a branch of metaphysics, which makes mathematical sciences 
part of natural philosophy.
In the Advancement of Learning, Bacon did not mention 
the importance of mathematics, as Rees states, both in phys-
ics and metaphysics and mechanics and magic; however, this 
does not mean Bacon did not give a role to mathematics in the 
Advancement of Learning, except in metaphysics. In a similar 
manner, when we look at De Augmentis Scientiarum, we see that 
Bacon does not mention natural history, which is also – along-
side with physics, metaphysics, mechanics and magic – a part of 
natural philosophy. However, we cannot deduce from this that 
Bacon did not give any role to mathematics in natural history.10 
Natural histories include the observations and records of the 
motions of celestial bodies, and these observations and records 
are not possible without the application of mathematics.11 As 
you remember, Bacon says that mixed mathematics considers 
quantity in so far as it assists to explain, demonstrate, and actu-
ate its subject axioms. When we consider mathematical sciences, 
actuating these axioms can be possible through mathematics. 
For example, for Bacon, after you develop a physical model of 
celestial motions, you can develop a mathematical model for it 
5 According to Bacon, while physics is the inquiry into material and efficient causes, metaphysics includes formal and final causes. 
However, natural philosophy does not include inquiries into final causes because, for Bacon, even though final causes are real, they are 
barren and beyond human comprehension. So, we can conclude that in Baconian natural philosophy metaphysics is only an inquiry into 
formal causes. For the classification of sciences in Baconian philosophy, see Anstey (2012) and Kusukawa (1996). For Baconian forms, 
see Whitaker (1970), Horton (1973, p. 243-244) and Rusu (2013, p. 192-197). On the rejection of inquiries into final causes in Baconian 
natural philosophy, see Pérez-Ramos (1988, p. 162) and Quinton (1993, p. 160).
6 Bacon defines the parts of pure mathematics as follows: “These are two, Geometry and Arithmetic; the one handling quantity contin-
ued, and the other dissevered” (Bacon, De augmentis, SEH IV, p. 370).
7 Bacon also uses the term ‘axiom’ for cause, such as ‘formal axioms’ instead of ‘formal causes’.
8 In De Augmentis Scientiarum, Bacon states:
Mathematic is either Pure or Mixed. To Pure Mathematic belong those sciences which handle Quantity entirely severed from matter 
and from axioms of natural philosophy. These are two, Geometry and Arithmetic; the one handling quantity continued, and the 
other dissevered (Bacon, De augmentis, SEH IV, p. 370).
9 Nobuo Kawajiri argues that Bacon gave a handmaiden (auxiliary) role to pure mathematics (see Kawajiri, 1979, p. 17). However, as I 
have tried to show above, Bacon did not give any role to pure mathematics in natural philosophy.
10 For the quantitative approach in Baconian natural history, see Rees (1985), Jalobeanu (2016) and Pastorino (2011a, 2011b). For Ba-
con’s conception of natural history as a foundation of true natural philosophy, see Manzo (2009) and Jalobeanu (2015b).
11 For a natural history of the heavens in Bacon, see Jalobeanu (2015a).
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to actuate the axioms regarding the motions of celestial bod-
ies into pract ice, such as designing a calendar or predicting the 
next lunar eclipse.12 Since mechanics and magic are the opera-
tive parts of natural philosophy, we cannot also think that Ba-
con did not give any role to mathematics for the operative part 
of natural philosophy in the Advancement of Learning. As you 
remember, both in the Advancement of Learning and De Aug-
mentis Scientiarum, Bacon says that mixed mathematics has as 
its subject some axioms and parts of natural philosophy, but 
he did not say some axioms of metaphysics. Instead, Bacon 
said both in the Advancement of Learning and De Augmentis 
Scientiarum ‘parts of natural philosophy’. Therefore, we must 
surmise that Bacon gave a role to mathematics in every part 
of natural philosophy both in the Advancement of Learning and 
De Augmentis Scientiarum, and this role was an auxiliary role 
to his inductive experimental method.13
3. Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that Bacon’s attitude towards 
the role of mathematics in natural philosophy did not change 
between his Advancement of Learning (1605) and De Augmen-
tis Scientiarum (1623); and related to this claim, I have also 
argued that Bacon gave an auxiliary role to mathematics both 
in the Advancement of Learning and De Augmentis Scientiarum.
Rees argues that, alongside metaphysics, Bacon extend-
ed the role of mathematics to physics, metaphysics, mechan-
ics and magic in De Augmentis Scientiarum. From this argu-
ment, we can conclude that Bacon gave a narrower role to 
mathematics in the Advancement of Learning. For Rees, Bacon 
placed mathematics as an adjunct of metaphysics in the Ad-
vancement of Learning. What we know about what Bacon of-
fered for the relation between mathematics and metaphysics 
in the Advancement of Learning is that he placed mathemat-
ics as a branch of metaphysics, and placing mathematics as 
a branch of metaphysics was not something about the role 
which was given to mathematics, but rather a classification of 
mathematics as a part of metaphysics, since its object (quanti-
ty determined) is one of the essential forms of things.
Bacon gave an auxiliary role to mathematics not only 
in De Augmentis Scientiarum but also in the Advancement of 
Learning, and placing mathematics as a branch of metaphysics 
both in the Advancement of Learning and De Augmentis Sci-
entiarum was a classification of mathematical sciences (that 
is, mixed mathematics) in metaphysics because the object of 
mixed mathematics (quantity determined) is one of the es-
sential forms of things.
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